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RAOUF BOUCEKKINE, AUDE POMMERET, AND FABIEN PRIEUR
For quite a long time, it has been claimed that the relationship between income and pol-
lution was inverted U-shape, yielding the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC
hereafter). This claim, based on several early empirical studies (see for example, Gross-
man and Krueger 1993), has been at the heart of a massive empirical and theoretical liter-
ature. Empirical research has mainly consisted in examining a wide variety of pollutants
for evidence of the inverted U-shaped pattern, resulting in the conclusion that such a shape
is valid for many local and flow pollutants. But it does not seem to be the rule for stock
pollutants like CO2 which do rather generate monotonically increasing relation between
wealth and pollution (see Brock and Taylor 2005, for a survey). Parallely, a great deal
of theoretical contributions has been devoted to identify conditions under which the EKC
arises. This includes optimal growth models like in Dinda (2004) and Stokey (1998) or
equilibrium models in the spirit of John and Pecchenino (1994), all with stock pollutant.
In all the contributions mentioned above, the role of the abatement technology is crucial.
For example, in the latter abatement starts only after a large amount of capital, and thus
pollution, is accumulated, ultimately generating the decreasing part of the EKC. A similar
scheme can give rise to the EKC under endogenous growth: the shift from insufficient to
sufficient investment in abatement in an advanced stage of development curves down the
pollution level at that stage. Another stream of the EKC literature puts forward technologi-
cal progress: if richer countries are supposed to use, say, more energy-saving technologies,
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which are typically costly to implement, then pollution goes down in sufficiently devel-
oped countries. We shall take this avenue in this paper. Precisely, we consider an optimal
technology adoption AK model in line with Boucekkine Krawczyk and Vallée (2011): an
economy, caring about consumption and pollution as well, starts with a given technolog-
ical regime and may decide to switch at any moment to a cleaner technology at a given
permanent or transitory output cost. At the same time, we posit that there exists a pollution
threshold above which the assimilation capacity of Nature goes down, featuring a kind of
irreversible ecological regime. It has been shown by Prieur (2009) that introducing such
an irreversibility in the John and Pecchenino model considerably weakens the EKC case.
We shall study how the irreversibility mechanism interacts with the ingredients of the opti-
mal technological switch problem outlined above, with a special attention to the outcomes
regarding the capital-pollution relationship.
Our contributions are twofold. First of all, our contribution is technical. It is well known
that including irreversibility in the above sense also induces an optimal switching time
problem from the reversible to the irreversible ecological regime. Accordingly, our optimal
AK growth model involves two optimal timing problems associated to technological and
ecological switching times respectively. Original multi-stage optimal control techniques
will be developed to solve the model, extending previous works of Tomiyama (1985) on
technological switching and Tahvonen and Withagen (1996) on ecological switching. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, the interaction between the ecological and technological mech-
anisms generates a large set of potential optimal solutions. These solutions feature different
relationships between capital and pollution. For our calibrated model, if a single techno-
logical switch is optimal, one recovers the EKC provided initial pollution is high enough.
If exceeding the ecological threshold is optimal, then the latter configuration is far from
being the rule.
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The problem
We consider an optimal growth AK model with two stocks, physical capital (K) and pol-
lution (P). Two production technologies are available from t = 0. Each can be described
by two parameters (Ai,qi), i = 1,2: Ai is marginal productivity of capital since the produc-
tion function is Y = Ai K, while qi measures the degree of dirtiness of the technology i.
Concretely, qi captures the marginal contribution of capital to the flow of pollution. The
economy starts with technology i = 1 and has to decide whether it switches to technology
i= 2, andwhen. The economy cares about both the levels of consumption and pollution. So
for the problem to be nontrivial, we shall assume that A1 > A2 but q1 > q2: technology 1 is
more productive but dirtier. A1−A2 measures the cost of adopting a cleaner technology, we
assume it permanent.The problem is at this stage similar to the one tackled in Boucekkine
Krawczyk and Vallée (2011). There are however two major differences with respect to the
latter contribution: the existence of capital accumulation and of pollution decay. We also
introduce a key feature: irreversible pollution as in Prieur, Tidball and Withagen (2011).
More precisely, the two state variables evolve according to the following laws of motion:
K˙ = (Ai− δ )K −C, for i = 1,2, C being consumption and δ the depreciation rate, and
P˙ = qi K−α jP, with i, j = 1,2 and α1 > α2 ≥ 0. The j subscript indexes the ecological
regime, here parameterized by the pollution natural decay rate α j. While the technological
switch from regime i = 1 to i = 2 does not require any minimal level of physical capital to
take place, an ecological switch from j = 1 to j = 2, where α1 > α2 ≥ 0, does naturally
entail the idea that nature cannot regenerate in the same way for low and high levels of the
stock of pollution. Typically, this is modeled through a threshold value for the pollution
stock, say P¯, above which the decay rate falls.1
As explained in the introduction section, putting together technological and ecological
switches enriches considerably the economic discussion. From the technical point of view,
the problem sounds at first glance strongly asymmetric, the technological switch involving
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explicit timing decisions while ecological switches are essentially based on a threshold
pollution level posited. It is however easy to see that this apparent asymmetry can be
attenuated: in line with the pioneering contribution of Tahvonen and Withagen (1996), it
is quite obvious to reformulate the ecological switching problem also as an optimal timing
problem: indeed, if such a switch occurs, it exists a date, say tP, where PtP = P¯ (assuming
P0 < P¯). As we shall see, this does not mean that the two state variables’ laws of motion
will imply similar optimality conditions. However, the previous observation legitimates the
formulation of the two switchings problems both as optimal timing problems. Hereafter, tK
with 0≤ tK ≤∞will refer to the timing of technological switching while tP with 0< tP≤∞
does the job on the ecological side.
Given these provisos, our optimal control problem can be written as:
max
{C,tK ,tP}
V =
∞∫
0
[U(C)−D(P)]e−ρtdt
subject to,
K˙ =
 (A1−δ )K−C if t ≤ tK(A2−δ )K−C else
and,
P˙ =

q1K−α1P if t ≤min{tK, tP}
q1K−α2P if tP < t ≤ tK
q2K−α1P if tK < t ≤ tP
q2K−α2P if t > max{tK, tP}
P0 < P¯ and K0 are given, ρ > 0 is the rate of pure time preference. The control set includes
the two timing variables mentioned above, plus consumption. The social welfare func-
tion is the same as in Tahvonen and Withagen (1996). The following standard regularity
conditions assure the concavity of the problems we will have to handle along the way:
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Hypothesis 1. The utility function, U(C), satisfies: U(0) = 0, U ′′(C) < 0, 0 <U ′(0) < ∞
and ∃!C˜/U ′(C˜)= 0. The damage function, D(P), satisfies: D(0)= 0, D′(P)> 0, D′′(P)≥ 0
and D′(0) = 0.
The optimal control problem stated above is novel in that the two timing problems are
of a different nature. In particular, one involves a threshold level for the state variable and
the other no. Problems with multiple timing have already been tackled in the literature
(see Saglam 2011) but in the latter literature only technological switching is considered.
Here two types of timing problems are mixed in the same framework; needless to say,
the interaction of both is very likely to give rise to a richer set of outcomes. Indeed, a
quick inspection into the set of optimal regimes allowed in our enlarged problem is enough
to get this point. A priori, one can list the following optimal regimes: 1. No switch, 2.
One technological switch, 3. One ecological switch, 4. Two switches: technological then
ecological and 5. Two switches: ecological then technological. It is not obvious at all to
guess a priori which kind of regime will result optimal given initial conditions, preferences
and available technological and ecological menus. Even worse, one can identify within
the optimal outcomes with at least one switch (the last five categories), different classes
of solutions: interior (that is tK > 0 and/or tP > 0) or corner (tK = 0). Eight regimes are
thus possible. Even more, one might be interested in distinguishing the case when there is
a simultaneous ecological and technological interior switch, which adds another possibly
interesting sub-case.
The next section gives our solution approach to this intricate problem.
The solution approach
We shall proceed as follows. First, for every possible regime k (k = 1 to 10 regimes from
the discussion just above), we write the corresponding first-order necessary conditions and
compute the resulting welfare function, say Vk. Then, we pick the regime which delivers
the largest social welfare, that is we identify the global maximum of the problem. The chal-
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lenge is first analytical because the general optimal control problem involved is nontrivial.
It is also computational because comparing nine possible regimes is highly demanding.
We shall ultimately resort to numerical comparison because our underlying optimal con-
trol problem does not admit a closed-form solution in most regimes. In the following, we
provide the general control theory foundations to identify the solutions with two interior
switches; this covers three cases: 0 < tK < tP < ∞, 0 < tP < tK < ∞, and 0 < tK = tP < ∞.
The other cases can be immediately recovered from the literature with one possible techno-
logical switch (see Boucekkine, Saglam and Vallée 2004) or one possible ecological switch
(Tahvonen and Withagen, 1996), including corner regimes.2
A natural approach is to decompose the problem into several sub-problems for given
timing variables, to solve each of them, and then to identify the optimal timings. With one
timing variable, two sub-problems are involved corresponding to the resulting two time
intervals, before and after the switch. In our case, three would result from the occurrence
of two switching times. In the spirit of Tomiyama (1985), we shall use the following
recursive scheme, illustrated here below on the case 0 < tK < tP < ∞:
• Third interval sub-problem: the problem in this regime is:
max
{C}
V3 =
∞∫
tP
[U(C)−D(P)]e−ρtdt
subject to, K˙ = (A2−δ ) K− CP˙ = q2 K−α2 P
where tP and the initial conditions K(tP) and P(tP) = P¯ are fixed. The associated hamil-
tonian is: H3 = [U(C)−D(P)] e−ρt +λ 22K ((A2−δ ) K− C)+λ 22P (q2 K−α2 P), where
λ i jv is the co-state variable associated with the state variable v = K,P in the technological
menu i and ecological regime j. The resulting value-function is of the form V ∗3 (tP,K(tP)).
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• Second interval sub-problem: in the next interval, the maximization problem is:
max
{C,tP,K(tP)}
V2 =
tP∫
tK
[U(C)−D(P)]e−ρtdt+V ∗3 (tP,K(tP))
subject to the corresponding dynamics, for regime i = 2 and j = 1, where tK , K(tK)
and P(tK) are given, and tP and K(tP) are free. Respectively denote by H2 and
V ∗2 (tK,K(tK),P(tK)) the corresponding hamiltonian and the resulting value-function.
• First interval sub-problem: This sub-problem considers the interval [0 tK]:
max
{C,tK ,K(tK),P(tK)}
V1 =V =
tK∫
0
[U(C)−D(P)]e−ρtdt+V ∗2 (tK,K(tK),P(tK))
subject to the dynamics of regimes i= 1 and j = 1, with K(0) and P(0) given, and with free
tK , K(tK) and P(tK). Again, denote the hamiltonian by H1 and it is obvious that V ∗1 =V
∗.3
Notice that each optimal control sub-problem is well-behaved, we will not spend space
on writing the corresponding standard Pontryagin conditions. Rather, we will focus on
uncovering the much trickier optimality conditions with respect to the timing variables and
the so-called matching conditions. Matching conditions refer to how hamiltonians and the
co-state variables behave at the optimal junction times. This is solved by the following
theorem.4
Theorem 1. Let 0 < t∗K < t∗P < ∞ be the optimal timing. Then:
H∗2 (tP) = H
∗
3 (tP) and H
∗
1 (tK) = H
∗
2 (tK),(1)
λ 22∗K (tP) = λ
21∗
K (tP),λ
21∗
K (tK) = λ
11∗
K (tK) and λ
21∗
P (tK) = λ
11∗
P (tK).(2)
A few comments are in order here. First of all, one can read the five optimality conditions
above are continuity or matching conditions at the junction times. In this respect, conditions
(1) impose the continuity of the hamiltonian at the optimal junction times while the other
conditions ensure the continuity of co-state variables at these times. Interestingly enough,
one can observe that while at the technological switching time, both co-state variables
are optimally continuous, only the one associated to K is necessarily continuous at the
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ecological switching time. This points at the major difference between the two switching
types: in the latter, pollution is fixed at the switching time, equal to the threshold value,
while at the technological switching time, both state variables can be freely chosen. This
generally implies discontinuity of the co-state variable associated to P at tP.
Second, one can interpret the matching conditions (1)-(2) as first-order optimal timing
conditions for tP and tK respectively. Generally speaking, the matching condition for timing
ti may be therefore written as: H∗i (tv)−H∗i+1(tv) = 0, for i = 1,2 and v = K,P. This con-
dition is quite common in the literature of multi-stage technological switching (see Saglam
2011). We show here that it applies also to ecological switches. Keeping the discussion
non-technical, one may interpret the difference H∗i (tv)−H∗i+1(tv) as the marginal gain from
extending the regime inherent to the time interval [ti−1, ti], with t0 = 0, at the expense of
the regime associated with interval [ti, ti+1]. Because there are no direct switching costs,
the marginal switching cost is nil. Therefore, the matching conditions on hamiltonians do
equalize marginal benefits and costs of delaying switching times. Hence they do feature
first-order necessary conditions with respect to the latters.5
There are two remaining cases of interest with two interior switchings, which derive
quite trivially from the analysis of the benchmark case. If ecological switching precedes
technological switching, that is if 0 < tP < tK < ∞, Theorem 1 still applies integrally. It
is indeed invariant to the sign of tK − tP as one can infer from the discussion following
Theorem 1. The last two (interior) switchings case follows the same logic though the list
of corresponding first-order timing and matching conditions is shorter because only two
successive regimes are involved, not three: one before tK = tP = ts and one after. Denoting
by Hi, λ iiK = λ
i
K and λ
ii
P = λ
i
P, i= 1,2, the hamiltonians and co-state variables corresponding
to the sub-problems on the intervals [0 ts] and [ts ∞) respectively, optimality conditions
reduce to H∗1 (t
s) = H∗2 (t
s) and λ 1∗K (ts) = λ 2∗K (ts).
We end this section by assessing briefly the impact of technical and ecological switching
on steady state. For any technological menu i = 1,2 and ecological regime j = 1,2, the
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expression of steady state capital and pollution are implicitly given by
U ′((Ai−δ )Ki j∞ ) =
qiD′(qiK
i j
∞
α j )
(Ai−δ −ρ)(ρ+α j) and P
i j
∞ =
qi
α j
Ki j∞ .
One can directly observe that both Ki j∞ and P
i j
∞ are non monotonic in the technological
menu (Ai,qi). In addition, if K
i j
∞ is decreasing in α j, Pi j∞ also is not monotonic in α j. Intu-
ition runs as follows. Suppose the planner adopts, at some instant, the new technological
menu. The reduction in Ai generates the usual income and substitution effects that am-
biguously affect investment. Moreover, the associated decrease in the intensity of pollution
qi, induced by the adoption of the new technology, lowers the social cost of capital ac-
cumulation and stimulates investment. So, there are different forces at play and it is not
immediately obvious which effect will prevail in the long run. In the same vein, the impact
of technology adoption on pollution is unclear. Of course, the decrease in qi is a means to
slow down pollution accumulation. But depending on whether technical change stimulates
investment, there is an indirect effect that may go the other way round. In the numerical
exercise to follow, we find it reasonable to assume that the adoption of the new cleaner
technology allows the economy to reach a less polluted steady state. Regarding the impact
of the ecological switch on steady state pollution, two effects are also pushing in opposite
direction. Indeed, a decrease in α j makes it more difficult for Nature to regenerate itself.
At the same time however, everything else equal, it tends to reduce the incentive to invest
in capital (through the higher social cost of pollution λ i jP ). From now on, we shall consider
the more realistic case where the ecological switch translates into higher pollution.
It is now time to apply this theoretical analysis and our solution approach to the optimal
growth model described in Section 2.
Numerical investigation
What should be the solution of the optimal growth problem with ecological and technical
switches? To what extent does this solution respond to changes in the fundamentals of the
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economy? What is the relationship between the two state variables, capital and pollution,
along the optimal path? These are the questions we shall address in this numerical analysis.
Model calibration
The analysis is conducted with the following utility and damage functions: U(C) = θC(C¯−
C) and D(P) = νP, with θ ,ν ,C¯ > 0. The set of baseline parameters used is
(3)
θ = 14.4,q1 = 0.04,q2 = 0.02,z = 120,A1 = 1/3,A2 = 0.25,K0 = 15,
P0 = 107,ρ = 0.05,δ = 0.075,α1 = 0.005,α2 = 0.002,c = 10,ν = 2.1
As for the discount rate, the chosen value is close to what most western governments
use for most long term investments. The depreciation rate is usually between 5% and
10% depending on the level of economic development. We choose 7.5%. A review of
the literature suggests that α1 = 0.005 (implying a half-life of 139 years, see Hoel and
Karp 2002). The technology parameter value (A1) is set in order to be consistent with
the observed K11/Y 11 = 3. Moreover in our model, emissions before technology adop-
tion are E11 = q1K11. According to the DICE model (Nordhaus 2008, figure 5-10 p.110),
E11/Y 11 = 0.12 for 2010, yielding q1 = 0.04. At the steady state, ν = −λ 11P∞(α1 + ρ).
According to the literature (see for instance Nordhaus 2008), the social damage costs of
carbon dioxide emissions cannot be than less than 20$ or 30$ per ton but could probably
not exceed 50$ per ton. Choosing 40$ to appraise the shadow price of pollution we obtain
ν = 2.1. At the steady state again, θ = γλ 11P∞q1/(ρ+δ −A1) where γ stands for the relative
risk aversion. We assume the latter to be equal to 5 that leads to θ = 14.4. Parameter C¯ in
the utility function has been arbitrarily chosen because it is a scale parameter that does not
affect conclusions of the simulations. Consistently with the discussion about the impact of
ecological and technical switches on steady state, in the benchmark we choose parameters
(A2,q2,α2) so that steady state pollution is lower (resp. larger) after the technical (resp.
ecological) switch than before. For the values reported in (3), it appears that steady state
capital is higher after the technical switch than before.6 So, if the adoption of the new tech-
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nology is costly in terms of investment in the short run, it is ultimately beneficial to capital
accumulation.
The last important discussion refers to the set of initial conditions. For the particular
issue of climate change, irreversible switches will likely occur if no severe action is under-
taken soon. Indeed, there is now growing evidence that oceans (the most important carbon
sink) display a buffering capacity that begins saturating. At the same time, the assimilation
capacity of terrestrial ecosystems will likely peak by mid-century and then decline to be-
come a net source of carbon by the end of the present century. Finally, the potential collapse
of the North Atlantic meridional overturning circulation is drawing much of the attention,
since it may happen for a 450 ppm CO2 concentration while we have already reached 390
ppm (Yohe et al. 2006). These considerations have led us to start the numerical exercise by
setting the level of initial pollution close enough to – but below – the ecological threshold.
In addition, it is worth noting that we have chosen a threshold P¯ < P11∞ . It implies that a
switch, either technical and/or ecological, will necessarily occur at some point in time. We
further assume that a technological switch is a priori a means to avoid the ecological switch
because P¯ > P21∞ . Finally, the initial endowment in capital K0 satisfies K0 < K
11
∞ (< K
21
∞ ).
Benchmark scenario
Solving our calibrated AK model with pollution and switches, we first observe the existence
of multiple optimality candidates. For the set of baseline parameters, we find solutions to
the necessary optimality conditions associated with three of the nine possible regimes: 1.
Technological switch alone, 2. Simultaneous technological and ecological switches and 3.
Immediate technological switch alone.
Interestingly enough, as far as the nature of the relationship between K and P is con-
cerned, these three candidates show very distinct features. Along the first regime, there is a
sustained capital accumulation during the period before the switch, investment being more
efficient than after tK . Consequently, K21∞ is nearly reached at the time of the switch and pol-
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lution rises as well during this phase (see figure 1, top). At some point in time (tK = 15.61),
the accumulated pollution and the level of capital become so high that the economy finds
it worthwhile to adopt the new greener technology. From that point on, pollution, starting
at a high level, decreases because natural assimilation now prevails on the lesser emissions
due to the new technology. In the second regime, capital accumulation is delayed relative
to what happens in the first regime in order to reach P¯ as late as possible (see figure 1,
second row). Once the double switch has occurred, pollution grows at a high rate because
the economy cannot rely anymore on a high regeneration rate. Finally, the economy may
choose to adopt immediately the new technology. In this third regime, we obtain a U-shape
relationship between K and P (see Figure 1, third row): from the beginning, the economy
is able with the new technology to accumulate capital while reducing the pollution stock.
What is the optimal regime? It turns out that it is the regime with a technical switch
alone (W1 = 2464.6 >W2 = 2432.81 >W3 = 1948.3). This result is very intuitive. Along
regime 1, the planner can avoid the ecological threshold and is therefore better off than
under regime 2. Regime 1 also dominates regime 3 because under the former, capital
accumulation benefits from a higher investment efficiency. To conclude this analysis, it is
worth mentioning that the optimal policy, with technical change alone, exhibits a capital-
pollution relationship that has the feature of the EKC.7
Let us investigate whether these results survive to modifications of critical parameters.
Sensitivity analysis
This section reviews all the possible variations around the baseline scenario. Table 1 sum-
marizes our findings.
Several interesting conclusions hold whatever the scenario considered. Firstly, the
regime with immediate technical switch always exists and is always dominated by another
solution. Secondly, there is no solution featuring a technical switch followed by an
ecological switch. Thirdly, each time a candidate with a technical switch alone exists, this
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yields the optimum. Last but not least, when the optimum is a technological switch alone,
the relationship between capital exhibits a turning point and consequently is inverted
U-shaped provided that initial capital and pollution are high enough8 and that agent are
sufficiently sensitive to pollution.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that under some scenarios, our conclusions sensibly differ.
In case where the intensity of pollution remains relatively high after adoption (q2 = 0.03),
the technological switch is not valuable to the planner. It implies that the optimum is the
regime with a simultaneous double switch. For a not too damaging pollution (ν = 1), a
small ecological threat (α2 = 0.003), or more impatient agents (ρ = 0.1), less attention is
paid to the ecological threshold and solutions to the regime with an ecological switch alone
exist. However, it is optimal only in the case where agents are relatively impatient. In such a
case, the capital-pollution relationship is not at all an EKC: it encompasses an intermediate
stage where pollution increases whereas capital decreases (see figure 1, bottom).
Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the income-pollution relationship within and optimal AK growth
model with technological and ecological switches. We show that the EKC, that is usually
seen as a description of the relationship between wealth and pollution along the different
development stages of one country, can also emerge as a result of the implementation of
the optimal policy from the current development stage of the economy.
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Notes
1The case α2 = 0 is the case for strong pollution irreversibility, we allow here for in-
termediate situations where the decay goes down above the threshold while nature keeps
some degree of regeneration.
2The case of two switchings, one interior and one corner, can be also settled similarly.
For example if 0 < tP < ∞ and tK = 0, one have just to solve for the ecological switch the
particular problem with tK = 0 given and the implied capital law of motion.
3One would use exactly the same scheme to handle a dynamic optimization problem in
discrete time over three periods. Here the Bellman principle applies on the three intervals
involved by the double timing problem instead of discrete periods of time.
4A detailed proof of the theorem is available upon request.
5The same type of arguments could be used to visualize easily the kind of necessary con-
ditions implied by corner switching times: for example immediate technological switching,
say t∗K = 0 implies H∗1 (0)−H∗2 (0)< 0.
6 Steady state values, for the benchmark, are: (P11∞ ,K
11
∞ ) = (147,18.4), (P
21
∞ ,K
21
∞ ) =
(109.4,27.4), (P12∞ ,K
12
∞ ) = (366.3,18.3) and (P
22
∞ ,K
22
∞ ) = (272.9,27.3).
7 Would A2 be closer to A1 (for instance A2 = 0.3, see table 1) the investment efficiency
gap before and after the switch would be reduced and the capital would be significantly
increasing after the switch, therefore leading to a nicer EKC.
8 For a low K0, assimilation prevails on emission at the beginning, thus generating a
decreasing relationship between K and P. For a low P0, the pollution keeps raising even
after the adoption of the new technology.
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Figures
Figure 1. Benchmark scenario: optimality candidates and corresponding paths. Last
row: optimum with ecological switch (ρ = 0.1)
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Tables
Table 1. Summary of results
Tech. switch Eco. switch tK < tP tP < tK
Bench. tK = 15.6, V = 2464.6 no no no
K0 = 5 tK = 22, V = 1257.9 no no no
P0 = 50 tK = 15.6, V = 4641 no no no
K0 = 5, P0 = 50 tK = 22, V = 3434,3 no no no
q2 = 0.01 tK = 10.2, V = 2578.2 no no no
q2 = 0.03 no no no no
α2 = 0.001 tK = 15.6, V = 2464.6 no no no
α2 = 0.003 tK = 15.6, V = 2464.6 tP = 96, V = 2431,3 no (tP, tK) = (108.4,122.2),
V = 2431.5
ν = 1 tK = 19.7, V = 4872.8 tP = 78.6, V = 4857.4 no no
ρ = 0.1 no tP = 81.9, V = 1206.5 no no
A2 = 0.3 tK = 5.9, V = 2568 no no no
tK = 0 tK = tP = t Opt. Relation K, P
Bench. V = 1948.3 t = 72.7, V = 2428.4 Tech. switch EKC
K0 = 5 V = 378.4 no Tech. switch no EKC
P0 = 50 V = 4124.7 t = 247.4, V = 4610.2 Tech. switch no EKC
K0 = 5, P0 = 50 V = 2563.8 no Tech. switch no EKC
q2 = 0.01 V = 2132 t = 72.5, V = 2434.2 Tech. switch EKC
q2 = 0.03 V = 1768 t = 72.9, V = 2422.7 switch tK = tP no EKC
α2 = 0.001 V = 1948.3 t = 74, V = 2426.1 Tech. switch EKC
α2 = 0.003 V = 1948.3 t = 71.5, V = 2430.8 Tech. switch EKC
ν = 1 V = 4280.8 t = 64.8, V = 4856.8 Tech. switch EKC
ρ = 0.1 V = 714.58 t = 68.8, V = 1206.4 Tech. switch no EKC
A2 = 0.3 V = 2503.2 t = 84.8, V = 2432.6 Tech. switch EKC
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